As some of you might know from previous threads, my mother happened to live near Pearl during the attack. My grandfather worked for Pan American... They were pretty much what Air America was during Vietnam since they were the only airline that serviced the Hawaiian Islands at the time. She has maintained the same story over the years that it was pretty much known that the Japanese were going to attack, just that the specific time wasn't known.

At any rate, I'm going to post some articles on the subject.

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December 7, 1941: A Setup from the Beginning


By Robert B. Stinnett*

As Americans honor those 2403 men, women, and children killed -- and 1178 wounded -- in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on December 7, 1941, recently released government documents concerning that "surprise" raid compel us to revisit some troubling questions.

At issue is American foreknowledge of Japanese military plans to attack Hawaii by a submarine and carrier force 59 years ago. There are two questions at the top of the foreknowledge list: (1) whether President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his top military chieftains provoked Japan into an "overt act of war" directed at Hawaii, and (2) whether Japan’s military plans were obtained in advance by the United States but concealed from the Hawaiian military commanders, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Lieutenant General Walter Short so they would not interfere with the overt act.

[b]The latter question was answered in the affirmative on October 30, 2000, when President Bill Clinton signed into law, with the support of a bipartisan Congress, the National Defense Authorization Act. Amidst its omnibus provisions, the Act reverses the findings of nine previous Pearl Harbor investigations and finds that both Kimmel and Short were denied crucial military intelligence that tracked the Japanese forces toward Hawaii and obtained by the Roosevelt Administration in the weeks before the attack.[/quote]

Congress was specific in its finding against the 1941 White House: Kimmel and Short were cut off from the intelligence pipeline that located Japanese forces advancing on Hawaii. Then, after the successful Japanese raid, both commanders were relieved of their commands, blamed for failing to ward off the attack, and demoted in rank.

President Clinton must now decide whether to grant the request by Congress to restore the commanders to their 1941 ranks. Regardless of what the Commander-in-Chief does in the remaining months of his term, these congressional findings should be widely seen as an exoneration of 59 years of blame assigned to Kimmel and Short.

But one important question remains: Does the blame for the Pearl Harbor disaster revert to President Roosevelt?

A major motion picture based on the attack is currently under production by Walt Disney Studios and scheduled for release in May 2001. The producer, Jerry Bruckheimer, refuses to include America’s foreknowledge in the script. When Bruckheimer commented on FDR’s foreknowledge in an interview published earlier this year, he said "That’s all b___s___."

Yet, Roosevelt believed that provoking Japan into an attack on Hawaii was the only option he had in 1941 to overcome the powerful America First non-interventionist movement led by aviation hero Charles Lindbergh. These anti-war views were shared by 80 percent of the American public from 1940 to 1941. Though Germany had conquered most of Europe, and her U-Boats were sinking American ships in the Atlantic Ocean – including warships – Americans wanted nothing to do with "Europe’s War."

However, Germany made a strategic error. She, along with her Axis partner, Italy, signed the mutual assistance treaty with Japan, the Tripartite Pact, on September 27, 1940. Ten days later, Lieutenant Commander Arthur McCollum, a U.S. Naval officer in the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), saw an opportunity to counter the U.S. isolationist movement by provoking Japan into a state of war with the U.S., triggering the mutual assistance provisions of the Tripartite Pact, and bringing America into World War II.

Memorialized in McCollum’s secret memo dated October 7, 1940, and recently obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, the ONI proposal called for eight provocations aimed at Japan. Its centerpiece was keeping the might of the U.S. Fleet based in the Territory of Hawaii as a lure for a Japanese attack.

President Roosevelt acted swiftly. The very next day, October 8, 1940, the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet, Admiral James O. Richardson, was summoned to the Oval Office and told of the provocative plan by the President. In a heated argument with FDR, the admiral objected to placing his sailors and ships in harm’s way. Richardson was then fired and in his place FDR selected an obscure naval officer, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, to command the fleet in Hawaii. Kimmel was promoted to a four-star admiral and took command on February 1, 1941. In a related appointment, Walter Short was promoted from Major General to a three-star Lieutenant General and given command of U.S. Army troops in Hawaii.

Throughout 1941, FDR implemented the remaining seven provocations. He then gauged Japanese reaction through intercepted and decoded communications intelligence originated by Japan’s diplomatic and military leaders.

The island nation’s militarists used the provocations to seize control of Japan and organized their military forces for war against the U.S., Great Britain, and the Netherlands. The centerpiece – the Pearl Harbor attack – was leaked to the U.S. in January 1941. During the next 11 months, the White House followed the Japanese war plans through the intercepted and decoded diplomatic and military communications intelligence.

Japanese leaders failed in basic security precautions. At least 1,000 Japanese military and diplomatic radio messages per day were intercepted by monitoring stations operated by the U.S. and her Allies, and the message contents were summarized for the White House. The intercept summaries were clear: Pearl Harbor would be attacked on December 7, 1941, by Japanese forces advancing through the Central and North Pacific Oceans. On November 27 and 28, 1941, Admiral Kimmel and General Short were ordered to remain in a defensive posture for "the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act." The order came directly from President Roosevelt.

As I explained to a policy forum audience at The Independent Institute in Oakland, California, which was videotaped and telecast nationwide over the Fourth of July holiday earlier this year, my research of U.S. naval records shows that not only were Kimmel and Short cut off from the Japanese communications intelligence pipeline, so were the American people. It is a coverup that has lasted for nearly 59 years.

Immediately after December 7, 1941, military communications documents that disclose American foreknowledge of the Pearl Harbor disaster were locked in U.S. Navy vaults away from the prying eyes of congressional investigators, historians, and authors. Though the Freedom of Information Act freed the foreknowledge documents from the secretive vaults to the sunlight of the National Archives in 1995, a cottage industry continues to cover up America’s foreknowledge of Pearl Harbor.



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* Robert B. Stinnett has worked as a journalist for the Oakland Tribune and the BBC, and is the author of the book, Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor (Free Press, 2000). This article is adapted from his presentation before the Independent Policy Forum held earlier this year at The Independent Institute in Oakland, California. Click here to order copies of this Independent Policy Forum transcript, audio tape, video, and/or the book, Day of Deceit.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY -- NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER
805 KIDDER BREESE SE -- WASHINGTON NAVY YARD
WASHINGTON DC 20374-5060


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Appendix A
Naval Messages Intercepted between 6 September and 4 December 1941

This appendix contains seventy-two selected Japanese naval messages intercepted between September and 4 December 1941 by Navy intercept sites at Hawaii, Guam, and Corregidor; these messages were not decoded and translated until September 1945-May 1946. At the end of the appendix are three diplomatic messages pertaining to the crisis which were translated on 8 and 30 December 1941. The Japanese naval messages are part of a total of 26,581 Japanese dispatches examined by U.S. Navy cryptanalysts.

The Japanese messages were originally discovered in a sanitized but unpublished group of 188 messages contained in a document obtained from the Navy Archives at Crane, Indiana by the then NSA Historian, Mr. Henry Schorreck. Subsequently, some of the messages were located among approximately 2,400 translations given to the National Archives by NSA in 1978-79. Wherever this occurs, the appropriate reference number (SRN) is provided. Under these circumstances, it is not yet possible to verify in what Japanese cryptosystem each message was enciphered, nor have all the messages in the unpublished source been found in those released to the National Archives. (See particularly SRN-115202 to SRN-117840.)

It is interesting to note that the work of decrypting and translating these messages occurred at the same time that the congressional investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor was being conducted. A review of the material provided witnesses before the congressional committee and to the committee itself by the Navy's Pearl Harbor Liaison Officer, however, indicates that these messages were not made available to the Liaison Office. Ship identifications were taken from Conway's All The World's Fighting Ships, 1922-46 (New York: Mayflower Books, 1980) and organizational relationships from The Imperial Japanese Navy in WW II, prepared in 1952 by U.S. Army, Far East Command, Military History Section.

The reader will note a 27 November 1941 message from Imperial Headquarters to the Striking Force containing the names of two Russian freighters, the Uzbekistan and the Azerbaidjan. The messages announced their presence in the Northern Pacific. Unhindered by restrictions of any kind, they were probably communicating with their owners in the Soviet Union. Their signals would have neatly supplied the basis for Seaman Z's sensational revelations that he had tracked the Japanese Striking Force's radio signals as it steamed toward Pearl Harbor. This episode is outlined in many secondary sources but most recently by John Toland and Edwin Layton in their books, Infamy, Pearl Harbor and its Aftermath and And I Was There, respectively.

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5 Sep
From: COS2
To: 2nd Fleet
Info: COSCombined
"A state of complete readiness for battle operations must be achieved by the first part of November ... exert even greater efforts toward achieving maximum fighting strength. ..."

9 Sep
From: COSCombined
To: All Fleet COS;
All Flt CINCs
"As conditions become more and more critical, each and every ship and unit will aim at being fully prepared for commencing war operations by the first part of November ... completing all personnel changes ordered 3 August ASAP." SRN-115533

4 Oct
Between 4 October and 15 November the 1stAirFlt conducted almost daily drills at fueling at sea. The messages were most revealing in that their addressees actually showed the force structure of the Strike Force and their respective Trains (Tankers).

6 Oct
From: 1stAirFltStf
Action: CdrCarDiv2
CdrKagoshima Air Grp
In 1st Air Flt aerial torpedo attack drill #13, which was to be conducted on 21 October against BatDiv1, Akagi and Kaga were each allotted nine torpedoes and "Sooryuu" and "Hiryuu" are each allotted six torpedoes. SRN-117453

13 Oct
From: Staff Combined
To: All Flags
This message concerned the first Combined Fleet Communications drill. It contained the first references to a Striking Force and Advanced Expeditionary Force and mentioned dispatches suitable for X+17, X+30, and X+45 days.

21 Oct
From: Tokyo Comms
To: ALLNAV
This message revised a Navy Call List by adding callsigns for new warships over a year before commissioning: the Yamato (BB) and the Agano (CL).

22 Oct
From: COS Sasebo SND
"Warship Agano launched ... today." SRN-116139

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24 Oct
From: 1stAirFlt
Staff
To: Staff6FLT
Staff DesRon1,
Staff BatDiv3,
Staff CruDiv8,
1st Air Flt,
CarDiv4,
Tokyo ComUnit,
Tokyo DF Control,
StaffCombined
This message announced the second Combined Fleet Comm Test and again cited the "Striking Force." Possible leading role for 1stAirFlt in Striking Force. SRN-117089

26 Oct
From: COS1stAir Flt
To: CruDiv8
DesRon1
SubRon1
This message requested that all ships scheduled to be assigned to the (Striking Force?) have all torpedoes adjusted by 18 November. SRN-116684

27 Oct
From: COS1stAirFlt
Experience has shown that in operations the Train frequently preceded the Main Body. Accordingly, Train-related messages were important. This message identified four tankers to be assigned 1stAirFlt and to rendezvous at Sasebo by 10 November.

27 Oct
From: Staff1stAir Fleet
To: StaffBatDiv3
Message arranged torpedo launching exercise for CarDivs1/2/5.

28 Oct
From: COS1stAirFlt
[Three messages to and from 1stAirFlt reinforced idea that CINC1stAirFlt was commander of Strike Force.] "On 30 October this Fleet will pick up from 5-10 (near surface) torpedoes at Sasebo. ... Classes on this torpedo will be held at Kanoya for about five days from the 31st and then (emphasis) will be shifted to firing practice. By working night and day it should be possible to complete 100 (attachments for torpedoes, probably bow or stern planes) by 5 November." SRN-117301

28 Oct
From: COS1stAirFlt
"As the increase in the number of torpedoes handled and the lack of personnel is causing grave delays in torpedo adjusting, please make special arrangements to send to this fleet from Yokosuka Air Group -- about 60 torpedo adjustment personnel to assist in the work of adjusting torpedoes between the end of October and 20 November -- 40 to Kanoya for CarDivs1/2 -- 20 to Ooita Air for CarDiv5. ... Please arrange increase of one torpedo officer to each of the carriers in CarDivs1/2/5." SRN-116323

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28 Oct
From: Yokosuka ND
"Send personnel and workers to carry out instructions on Type 91 torpedoes (equipped with stabilizers). ..." SRN-116476

28 Oct
COS1stAirFlt
On 27 and 28 October arranged for two tankers to join his fleet by about 10 November -- the Shinkopu Maru and Toohoo Maru. In the meantime these tankers were being equipped for refueling under tow.

30 Oct
From: COS1stAirFlt
Action: Kuroshia
Maru or Shinkoku Maru
Info: Kure NavyYrd
Kure Sanda Section
CdrCarDiv2, U/I
"When installation of gear for refueling undertow and preparations for action have been completed, Kuroshio (KOKU/CHOO) Maru and Shinkoku (KAMI/KUNI) Maru will depart Sasebo and Kure, respectively, on the 13th and proceed to Kagoshima Bay, conducting exercises with carriers en route. Request they load fuel oil for refueling purposes before they depart." SRN-116588

1 Nov
From: CINC1stAirFlt
"After completing battle preparations Tooei Maru will obtain about 750 drums of fuel oil (for use of Akagi) and 12,000 kerosene tins of fuel oil (for Hiryu) from Yokosuka ... and rendezvous at Sasebo 10th. ..." SRN-117150

1 Nov
From: CdrSubRon6
To: CINC2
" ... Kinu and Yura will ambush and completely destroy the U.S. enemy." SRN-117001

2 Nov
From: Navy Minister
To: Yokosuka ND
"Have Air Depots 2 and 11 supply live bombs to Akagi, Soryu, Hiryu Shokaku, and Zuikaku to ascertain their capabilities. ..." SRN-117665

3 Nov
A message from the Chief of Naval Technical Bureau, General Affairs Section, to the Yokosuka, Sasebo, Kure, and Maizuru Yards emphasized that work on transport vessels be completed by 20 November.

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3 Nov
From: Staff1stAirFlt
To: CdrSaekiAirBase
"In the 3rd Special Drill in ambushing, 54 shipboard bombers will carry out a bombing and strafing attack in sight of Saeki Base from 0815 on the 4th, 0715 on the 5th, and 0815 on the 6th, and about an hour or hour and a half afterward 54 shipboard attack planes will carry out a similar bombing attack." SRN-117665

4 Nov
From: CdrCarDiv2
"CdrDesDiv23 will dispatch Yuuzuki (DD) to Saeki to arrive about 0700 the 6th. Yuuzuki will pick up and take to Kagoshima (4) torpedoes which CarDivs1/2 are to fire against anchored capital ships on the morning in question. ..."

5 Nov
The equipment for refueling under tow at sea included special fenders .9mm in diameter, and their requisite lines for attaching them to the tanker. on this date a message listed 10 Mary vessels, at least five of which were firmly associated with the Striking Force. SRN-117031

5 Nov
In addition to refueling from tankers the Strike Force would be required to carry a deck cargo of oil drums. On carriers, the extra weight of the drums was cause for concern as shown by the following advice to COS 1st Air Fleet from the Chief, Bureau Military Affairs Section: "Regarding the loading of drums of fuel oil on ships of your fleet. ... it will affect the strength of the hull and the ship's performance.
A. Amount to be loaded: Akagi, under 600 tons; Soryu and Hiryu under 400 tons, and an equivalent weight will be removed.
B. In the case of Akagi and Hiryu, load amidships and avoid bow and stern.
C. In the case of Soryu, load evenly over length of ship.
D. We have prepared 1400 tons. ..." SRN-116566

9 Nov
From: CINC1stAirFlt
From: CdrDesRon
The fact that major combat elements of the Strike Force were to be at sea on 13-14 November was revealed in two messages directing fueling at sea exercises for four Maru vessels with Akagi, DesRon1, CruDiv8, CarDiv2 and CarDiv5 and from CdrDesRon1 directing that the Hiryu and a tanker drill on the 15th off Ariake Bay (extreme southern Japan). SRN-115709, 115784

10 Nov
From: CINC6
To: 6thFltSubs
Info: AllFltCINCS
Maintain wartime radio silence on shortwave commencing 0000 November 11, SRN-117687

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10 Nov
From: COSKureND
Info: COS1stAirFlt
"Arrangements have been made to (reequip) four Maru vessels for simultaneous port and starboard refueling by 13 November." SRN-117258

11 Nov
From: CINC1stAirFlt
This message assigned anchorages at Saeki Wan (western Inland Sea) to the capital ships and tankers of the Strike Force. SRN-115787

12 Nov
From: COS Combined Flt
Action: NavyTechBur Kure Navy Yrd
"In view of the necessity for completing by 17 November the installation for refueling at sea. ..." SRN-116589

12 Nov
From: CdrDesRon1
This message suggested that the entire Strike Force did not depart Inland Sea on 10 November: "In view of the scheduled operation of this unit it is desirable to complete loading of antiaircraft ammunition and fuses ... for Abukuma, (CL, DesRon1 Flagship) DesDiv17, DesDiv15, and Akigumo (DD launched 4 November 1941 associated with CarDiv5 by (13 November). ..." SRN-115543

12 Nov
From: TokyoNGSScty
To: SctyCombined
Info: Scty1stAirFlt
The following message seemed to firmly identify CINC1stAirFlt as Strike Force Cmdr: "Please supply the Striking Force with copies of the Special Area Designator List (used by NGS) from those which have already been (secretly) issued to your headquarters." SRN-115381

14 Nov
From Navy Minister
To: ALLNAV
"The publication Wartime Recognition Signals for Japanese Merchant Shipping will be placed in effect 1 December 1941. ..." SRN-115380

14 Nov
From: CdrCarDiv5
To: CINC1stAirFlt
"Flagship was changed to Zuikaku at 0830 on 14th ... 1st Section, Zuikaku and Akigumo; 2d Section Shokaku and Oboro." SRN-115712

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14 Nov
From: CINCCombined
To: 7 Marus
Message assigned 5 Maru vessels to CINCS1stAir, 2ndFlt, and 4thFlt. SRN-115785

15 Nov
From: Tokyo Bureau of Mil Prep
Message assigned Akebono Maru to 1st Air Flt.

16 Nov
From: CINC1stAirFlt
To: CdrDesDiv15
CdrDesRon1,
CdrSubRon1,
1stAirFlt (less CarDiv4, CarDiv3),
CdrBatDiv3,
Info: CINCSAllFlts
Tokyo DF Control
Hdg resolved question of who commands and composition of the Striking Force: "Strike Force OPORD#1: Commencing 0000 19 November, 'Battle Control' effective for short wave frequencies and 'Alert Control' for long wave." SRN-115397

16 Nov
From: SctyCombined
To: Flagships
Two messages revealed details of designator list and scope of forthcoming fleet operations: "Revision #1 to Navy Call list #9 effective November 15: Striking Force, Submarine Force (Southern Force), Maru Force, Communications Force, Commerce Destruction Force, Advance Expeditionary Force, Supply unit. . .(for each force), Southern Force, Northern Force, South Seas Force, E Force (British Malaya)*, H. Force (Dutch East Indies)*, M Force (Philippines)*, Attached Force, G Occupation Force (Guam)*, AA Occupation Force (Wake)* and AF Destruction Units (Midway)* "(*ca 1942)."

17 Nov
From: Chief 1st Section NGS
To: COS1stAirFlt
Info: CdrBatDiv3
[The next seven messages were pivotal in locating the Strike Force.] BB Hiei was 1st section of BatDiv3.) "Suzuki (1776) is being sent to your Hq on board Hiei to report inspection results." SRN-116436

18 Nov
From: Chief 1st Section, NGS
To: COS Ominato Guard District
Info: COS1stAirFlt
"Please arrange to have Suzuki (1776) who was sent to the 1stAirFlt on business, picked up at about 23 or 24 November at Hittokapu Wan by -- of your command." (Hittokapu Wan is located in the Kurile Islands at about 45N-147-40E). SRN 116643. See also Prange, At Dawn We Slept, Ch 43, 342-52, for identity of Suzuki and his mission.

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19 Nov
From: COS Ominato Guard District
To: NFS,1stSecCh
"He (Suzuki) will be taken aboard the Kunajiri (CA)." SRN 116920

19 Nov
From: CINC Comb Flt
To: All Flagships Combined Fleet
"The fourth series of communications tests for the Combined Fleet will be held as follows: (on November 22 and 23). 2. Participating Forces: Combined Fleet (However, the forces presently en route to the Standby Location will not receive test). 3. Principal topic for consideration in this drill: Investigation and study of the communications setup required to effectively handle the situation upon opening up of hostilities. ..." SRN 115678 and Prange, At Dawn We Slept, 332.

19 Nov
From: ProbSubUnit
To: CINCCombined,
CinC1stAirFlt,
CdrTokyoComUnit,
CdrYokosukaComUnit,
CINC6,
CdrOminatoComUnit
"...until 2000, the 20th, Yokosuka Comm Zone. Until 800, the 22nd, Ominato Comm Zone. Thereafter, 1stAirFltFlagship Comm Zone." SRN 117673

19 Nov
From: ProbSubUnit
To: CINC1stAirFlt
CINC6
CdrTokyoComUnit
CdrOminatoComUnit
CdrYokosukaComUnit
"...until 2000 the 20th Yokosuka Comm Zone. From 2000 the 20th until 0800 the 22nd, Ominato Comm Zone. Thereafter, 1stAirFlt flagship Comm Zone." (Ominato is approx 41N-141E). SRN 117666/117674

20 Nov
From: StaffSubDiv2
To: CdrOminatoComUnit,
YokosukaComUnit,
Staff6FLT,
Staff1stAirFlt
"I-19 will leave Yokosuka Comm Zone on November 21, and enter Ominato Comm Zone. At 1600 November 22 will enter 1stAirFleet Flagship Comm Zone." SRN 116329/116990

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20 Nov
From: CINCCombined
To: CINC2nd
CINC3rd
CINC4th
CINC11thAirFlt
CINC1stAirFlt
SaseboComUnit
Southern Expeditionary Fleet (Less SubRon/6)
"...At 0000 on 21 November repeat 21 November, carry out Second Phase of preparations for opening hostilities." SRN-115385

20 Nov
From: CINC11thAirFlt
To: 11thAirFlt
"Commencing 20 November, when planes (or plane units) are shifted, maintain precautionary shortwave silence."

20 Nov
From: Hainan Guard District
To: Hainan Force Staff
"Report of leakage of secret information regarding the concentration of our troops on Hainan Island to a foreigner. Commencing 24 November no one will be permitted to leave or enter Hainan Island. ..." SRN-115438

20 Nov
From: Shiriya
Action: COSCarDivs, Combined Flt
"1. Will complete loading fuel oil (aviation gasoline) and other miscellaneous equipment 21 November. 2. The main generator and other minor repairs will be completed 23 November. 3. Expect to get underway on the 24th and join up during morning of 27 November. 4. Striking Force Secret Operation Order #6 has not been received." SRN-115375

21 Nov
From: Navy Minister
To: All Majcoms Afloat
[Radio calls are normally effective for about six months. The last change was on 1 November. The following message is noteworthy.] "Commence using Call List #10 from 1 December and discontinue using List #9 as of 30 November."

21 Nov
From: C.O.Shiriya
To: CdrDesDiv7
"We are now undergoing overhaul at Yokosuka. Expect to depart November 24 and arrive Sea on November 27. Advise rendezvous point with your unit. Regard fueling at sea ..." (DesDiv7 is escort of CarDiv1, Akagi and Kaga)

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22 Nov
From: PossCarDiv4
Kasuga Maru and Hokaze (DD) CarDiv4 ordered to transport planes from Sasebo to Palau ASAP.

25 Nov
From: Chief, 1st Section, Naval Sec, Imperial Hq
The Japanese had maintained a close interest in the U.S. Marines at Shanghai and Tientsen for several weeks and knew they would be evacuated on the American liners President Madison and President Harrison. This message ordered COS China Area Fleet to report time of departure by urgent dispatch to 2nd and 3rd Fleets, 2nd China Expeditionary Fleet and Bako Guard District. See SRN 116737, 27 November.

25 Nov
From: COS2
To: COSCombined
Info: COS3
"... Since we have assigned all eight patrol boats to the Philippine Force and orders for their use have already been issued ..." SRN-116910

25 Nov
From: CINCCombined
To: All Flagships
"From 26 November, ships of Combined Fleet will observe radio communications procedure as follows:
1. Except in extreme emergency the Main Force and its attached force will cease communicating. ..." SRN-116866

25 Nov
From: Imperial Hq,
1stSecNavSecCh
To: COS2,
COS3,
COS4,
COS11th Air,
COSSEF,
COSChina Area Fleet,
All ND COS
"(Plans) for exhaustive conscription of ... and civilians are in hands of Central Authorities. In order to preserve security, however, they will be activated at a future time. ..." SRN-116908

26 Nov
From: COS2
Anticipating casualties the Navy arranged for hospital facilities for the end of December. "Complete all necessary arrangements for the hospitalization of 1,000 patents each at Bako (including Takao), Sama, and Palau. ... Be prepared to supply ten times the annual 'battleship requirements' of medical supplies for dressing of wounds and disinfection by 10 February 1942." SRN-115439

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26 Nov
From: ComCarDiv3
To: CINC2
Info: CINC3
"In view of this force's operations and future we definitely desire to be refueled before arriving at Palau. ..."

27 Nov
From: 1stSecNavSec
Imperial Hq.
To: Striking Force
COSCombined
"Although there are indications of several ships operating in the Aleutians area, the ships in the Northern Pacific appear chiefly to be Russian ships. ... They are Uzbekistan (about 3,000 tons ... 12 knots) and Azerbaidjan (6,114 tons less than 10 knots). Both are westbound (from San Francisco)." SRN-116667

27 Nov
From: TokyoComUnit
To: All Fleets
From: 1stSecNavSec
Ch,Imperial Hq
To: Striking Force,
COSCombined
"1. Weather report. The low pressure center of 740mm which was near 'N RI 0 Na' today at noon, is advancing at a speed of 45km. Wind speed is over 15m, within 1000km to SW of center and about 26mm near the center. The high pressure center in "RU" area continues to proceed eastward at a speed of 45km. 2. Prince Hiroyasu Fushimi send the following msg to CINC Nagumo: 'I pray for your long and lasting battle fortunes.'" SRN-116668

27 Nov
From: Navy Minister
To: All Majcoms,
CINCall NDs,
CINC All Guard Districts
"From now on all merchant shipping, all Naval Comm units, and Naval Shipping will stand radio guard (Listening watch) as set forth in Articles 12 and 13 of Secret Communication Regulations for Merchant Shipping." SRN-115636

28 Nov
From: Imperial Hq.
NGS
To: All Majcoms
"Beginning 1 December 1941, Tokyo Comm Unit will initiate broadcasts on ... 4175kc in order to (maintain) volume of traffic ... afloat, etc., in accordance with principles given in 2nd Communications Analysis of 1941."

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28 Nov
From: Ch1stSec,Nav
Sec, Imperial Hq.
To: All Majcoms,
All NDs,
All Guard Dist,
Tokyo Hydro office
"Commencing this date, in special weather reports sent from (this office) locations will be indicated by Navy Grid Chart -- afloat weather list." SRN-115456

28 Nov
From: Ch1stSec,Nav
Sec, Imperial Hq
To: Striking Force
"At noon on the 28th a high pressure area of __mm located in 'TSU' and 'HE' sectors moving ESE ... 55kmh. Another high pressure center of about the same pressure in 'U' sector is almost stationary. ..." SRN-115690

29 Nov
From: CINC4
"All capital ships, destroyers, submarines of the South Sea Force and the Kukokawa Maru are to maintain battle condition short wave silence, starting 1200 Nov 29." SRN-115435

29 Nov
From: (6thBasFor)
To: CdrGdDiv#52
CdrGdDiv53
Info: DesRon6
Cdr4th lt
"The following forces are to be added to the special landing forces for the "U" Occupation Operations. ..." SRN-115396

30 Nov
From: COSBakoGuardDist
Action: COSCombFlt
COS2ndFlt
COSSouthChinaFlt
"At 0200 the 30th, auxiliary gunboat ASO Maru observed three American minesweepers (650 tons) of __ class at point 10 miles on a northeasterly course. In reference to __ #81, it is believed that the Pescadores and Takao areas are being reconnoitered. We are attempting to confirm these movements." SRN-117290

30 Nov
From: ChTokyoComOf
To: Striking Force
Info: COSCombined
"At noon on the 30th, a high pressure area of __mm located in "YU," "RE," "TSU," "HO," "U" blocks with other areas quiet on the whole. ... conditions will continue for about two more days. At 0900 on the 30th there was a five meter west wind in AI (Oahu*) and rain at AF (Midway*)." (*ca 1942) SRN-115460

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1 Dec
From: COSSaseboND
To: CdrOkinawa
Area Base Force
"We have received word from Naha customs that the Philippine registered ship KUROBEERUGOO (kana) (44-ton) arrived in Naha on 30 Nov. Seal her radio at once -- delay departure of this ship -- prevent their learning of our activities." SRN-117693

1 Dec
From: Shiriya
To: ComDesDiv7
"This ship is proceeding direct to position 30-00N, 154-20E. Expect to arrive that point at 1800 on 3 Dec. Thereafter will proceed eastward along the 30 degree North latitude line at speed of 7 knots." SRN-115398

2 Dec
From: CINCCombined
To: Combined Flt
"This dispatch is Top Secret. This order is effective at 1730 on 2 December. Climb NIITAKAYAMA 1208, repeat 1208." (Climb Mount Niitaka December 8) SRN-115376 (In late 1945, possibly with knowledge in hand that this message was stipulated in Flt OPORDER#1, its meaning is understood by OP-20-G to be, "Attack on 8 December." In the congressional investigation this message was incorrectly reported as sent on 6 December 1941. (Hearings Part 1, 185))

2 Dec
From: NavMinister
To: All ND CINCS
All GD CINCS
All Fleet CINCS
"Starting 4 December 1941, system #8 of Naval Code will be used and system #7 discontinued. (List 7 will still be used with some Japanese stations.)" SRN-116741

2 Dec
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu
[In connection with the CarDiv2 message of 4 November 1941 regarding preparations to fire torpedoes against anchored capital ships, the following message in a naval attaché system was particularly noteworthy. This message was received in Washington on 23 December 1941 and translated by the Army on 30 December 1941. (Connorton, Appendix 1, 194, item 87)] "In view of the present situation the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of the utmost importance. Hereafter, advise me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-[torpedo] nets."

3 Dec
From: CINCCombined
To: Combined Flt
"From 0000, Dec 4th change ship frequency system to #1. ..."

-65-



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page 66

5 Dec
From: BurMilPrep, Tokyo
To: NavAttaché, Washington, Mexico
[Only one message was found after 0000 4 December 1941 in the old cipher which could have been read before 8 December.] "Copy being sent by wire to Naval Attaché London. Dispose of the Cipher Machine and all of its rules for use at once."

6 Dec
From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
[Regarding the torpedo net message of 2 December in diplomatic channels the following was translated by the Army on 8 December 1941]: "... in my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. ..."

If you havent noticed, Im not very trusting of the government. And there are many reasons. When it comes to pearl harbor, my grandfather was at his post at the time. He was working with a group of guys, keeping their eyes open, for whatever.

One of the men saw the planes comming, and was trying to phone an alert, but his commanding officer stopped him. The planes went by, and on to their attack.

After he came back home, my grandfather went looking into public records, and finding information at the library. But one day when he came back, all of the records and information that he had read, were now gone. Except for family, and maybe some war buddies, he kept his mouth shut.

Chaotic, I don't think a conspiracy as you incicate your grandfather may have been part of existed, simply becuase it would be too hard to keep quiet at all those levels. I believe his CO acted stupidly, but why would a warning not be issued? The attack was taking place regardless, at that point a warning would have made no differnce to ship losses, but may have made a dent in the casualties.

I made up my mind many years ago that if I werre ordered to to do something that appeared to be incredibley stupid or immoral, I had a choice to obey the order or not. If I chose to honor my oath, that would not stop me from coming back and shooting the guy that issued the order, and sufferring the consequences.

But if it didn happen as he stated, why wouldn't your grandfather have done the honorable thing and exposed the plot?

I ahve a few questions of my own.

How many battle groups were being tracked in the year 1941? Was this the only one?

Was it neccessary to provoke Japan to attack or was an attack inevitable.

The numbers of people privy to the conspracy must have in the hundreds, with the numbers of people who stumbled upon the truth in the thousnds. Why has no eyewitness ever come forward?

NOne of these questions provve there was no conspiracy, they are simpley questions.

Was it neccessary to provoke Japan to attack or was an attack inevitable.

According to John Toland and his book Day of Infamy, the Japanese tried to do everything they could to prevent a war with the U.S.

The numbers of people privy to the conspracy must have in the hundreds, with the numbers of people who stumbled upon the truth in the thousnds. Why has no eyewitness ever come forward?

It may not be as grand as you suggest. We apparently had broken the Japanese code... something that itslef would be Top Secret, and accessable only to a small few. It's probably safe to say that whatever mesages they interecepted and decoded went straight to the Joint Chiefs, and then to the President. The actual decision to ignore the warnings were probably decided and known by a relative handful.

That then assumes they werre all dishonorable men. Could be, tho not likely.

From a lot of the reading i have done, there were two camps in the military, one for war, and one against. As you know the militarists were running the show until the last day of the war. This group felt that war withthe US was inevitable, and stood in thier way of taotal conquest of the South and western Pacifac, virtually all of the Pacifac rim. By 12/41 Japan had been engaged in conquest for some time. Alot of the conspiracy theorists seem to suggest the US forced Japan, a benign peaceful nation, into attacking. Teh facts show Japan was a brutal warlike nation that until 42 had never suffered a significant military loss. They were cocky and thought they were invinceable.

Originally posted by Turbostang She has maintained the same story over the years that it was pretty much known that the Japanese were going to attack, just that the specific time wasn't known

Thats an interesting perspective to me since "surprise" has always been the key word with regards to the attack on Pearl.

The Japanese prepared for months for the attack. The only knowledge we had of this was from a Russian spy as far as I've been able to see anywhere. Even with that, the specific target couldn't exactly be determined.

I still tend to feel that if Roosevelt did have any knowledge he would have been more than foolish to jeopardize the entire Pacific Fleet. Almost the reverse of the Germans not fully manning the coast of France before Normandy.

That has always bothered me. Someone clever enough to dupe the Japs to attack, then lose the fleet? That part makes no sense.

That then assumes they werre all dishonorable men. Could be, tho not likely.

It could also have been that only a handful could really see the whole picture.

FDR was pretty dishonerable. As you also know, the president has the ability to appoint staff members. It would make sense that he would appoint people sympathetic to his point of view. Just look at Bill Clinton...

From a lot of the reading i have done, there were two camps in the military, one for war, and one against. As you know the militarists were running the show until the last day of the war. This group felt that war withthe US was inevitable, and stood in thier way of taotal conquest of the South and western Pacifac, virtually all of the Pacifac rim. By 12/41 Japan had been engaged in conquest for some time. Alot of the conspiracy theorists seem to suggest the US forced Japan, a benign peaceful nation, into attacking. Teh facts show Japan was a brutal warlike nation that until 42 had never suffered a significant military loss. They were cocky and thought they were invinceable.

No question about what Japan was doing in CHina. However, where do we draw the line at playing global cop? What they were doing in China had nothing to do with us.

FDR wanted to get us into a war, but knew he couldn't make a case for it with the non-interventionist movement at the time. The only way he could pull something like that off would have been a surprise attack by the Japanese.

They did not think they were invincible. They knew they couldn't win a war ith the U.S. What they had hoped would happen would be to take out the U.S. fleet, put Hawaii under a naval blockade, and then sue for peace on their terms.

That has always bothered me. Someone clever enough to dupe the Japs to attack, then lose the fleet? That part makes no sense.

Consider this... the Pacific war was primarily fought with aircraft carriers. Notice how all of our carriers at the time were out to sea. There was only one real surface battle fought in the Pacific, and that was near the end of the war. In that sense, the Japanese were never able to destroy the vital part of our fleet.

Originally posted by Turbostang Consider this... the Pacific war was primarily fought with aircraft carriers. Notice how all of our carriers at the time were out to sea. There was only one real surface battle fought in the Pacific, and that was near the end of the war. In that sense, the Japanese were never able to destroy the vital part of our fleet.

True and not. Carrier warfare had not been proven till, what, Midway?

The fact that the japanese destroyed our battleships with their planes was what carriers WERE originally intended for. I don't think the concept of carrier vs. carrier had been seriously considered. Traditionally, I think even at that date, surface battleships were desired to control sea lanes and "ground" so to speak.

To not get our carriers was a major blow to the japanese as these were the vessels that most threatened them also. To me, they were willing to take what ever they could get and would have proceeded with their attack.

Maybe I'm working with the hindsight of history. I just can't see that so much of the fleet being in was something that the japanese expected or that FDR would have even fed them. He seemed pretty cautious once the war started.

Originally posted by Cosmo
Chaotic, I don't think a conspiracy as you incicate your grandfather may have been part of existed, simply becuase it would be too hard to keep quiet at all those levels. I believe his CO acted stupidly, but why would a warning not be issued? The attack was taking place regardless, at that point a warning would have made no differnce to ship losses, but may have made a dent in the casualties.

He was posted a long distance from pearl harbor. Any warning would have helped. But they did not get any.


I made up my mind many years ago that if I werre ordered to to do something that appeared to be incredibley stupid or immoral, I had a choice to obey the order or not. If I chose to honor my oath, that would not stop me from coming back and shooting the guy that issued the order, and sufferring the consequences.

And a long time ago I decided that I would not let an idiot command me, and possibly get me killed. One man playing a game of politics could get a ton of normal guys like me killed.

But if it didn happen as he stated, why wouldn't your grandfather have done the honorable thing and exposed the plot?

Times were different back then. If someone tried to pull that BS now, it would get out and the media would have a party. Back then, there were sayings like 'loose lips sink ships' and all that crap. The "honorable thing" to do was keep his mouth shut. I dont know how much danger he would have been in if he did tell, but he couldnt do much without evidence, which was gone before he knew it.

Not everything is a conspiracy, but our government has its share.

Originally posted by ChaoticThoughts


He was posted a long distance from pearl harbor. Any warning would have helped. But they did not get any.


Why didn't the officer let a warning go out? Since a warning made no difference, the attack would have gone forward regardless, the "no warning" order served no purpose to the success of the conspiracy, why do it then, and let a few more poeple in on it?

Originally posted by ChaoticThoughts

And a long time ago I decided that I would not let an idiot command me, and possibly get me killed. One man playing a game of politics could get a ton of normal guys like me killed.



I don't know what branch of the service you were in. My experience was that one does not get to choose who commands, the military is not a democracy. You don't get to choose. You do get to follow orders, and to do so without question, it is one of the things that makes an army work-discipline. You take an oath to follow orders, you give your word in other words, not something lightly done.

Originally posted by ChaoticThoughts

Times were different back then. If someone tried to pull that BS now, it would get out and the media would have a party. Back then, there were sayings like 'loose lips sink ships' and all that crap. The "honorable thing" to do was keep his mouth shut. I dont know how much danger he would have been in if he did tell, but he couldnt do much without evidence, which was gone before he knew it.



So he didn't do the honorable thing, the right thing because he was afraid? I can understnad that, fear keeps a lot of people form doing the right thing. Fear keeps a lot of people from becoming heros, why there are so few.

Originally posted by Cosmo Why didn't the officer let a warning go out? Since a warning made no difference, the attack would have gone forward regardless, the "no warning" order served no purpose to the success of the conspiracy, why do it then, and let a few more poeple in on it?

When there is a plan, you follow it. Im sure. But if they had given warning, there could have been an evacuation, and maybe put some planes up in the air to fight them off.

I don't know what branch of the service you were in. My experience was that one does not get to choose who commands, the military is not a democracy. You don't get to choose. You do get to follow orders, and to do so without question, it is one of the things that makes an army work-discipline. You take an oath to follow orders, you give your word in other words, not something lightly done.

I did not and will not join. Its the only way to insure that someone else does not control both my life and death. For instance, If bush chooses to fight iraq, regardless of how I think of it, I would have to go in. If I have to be a butcher, or end up in a death trap, its the choice of someone else. I couldn't stand that.

So he didn't do the honorable thing, the right thing because he was afraid? I can understnad that, fear keeps a lot of people form doing the right thing. Fear keeps a lot of people from becoming heros, why there are so few.

Part fear, but also because of his word. Like you said, its not something done lightly. How do you feel about those who let out government secrets, or let out ideas of conspiracies, that make us look bad? They are called traitors, or commies, and sometimes crackpots. It was either let out the truth to a public that wouldnt accept it, or live a normal life.

Originally posted by ChaoticThoughts


When there is a plan, you follow it. Im sure. But if they had given warning, there could have been an evacuation, and maybe put some planes up in the air to fight them off.


My point is, why was it neccessary to be part of the plan? Why wouold putting some planes up be a bad thing? Japan still would have been guilty of a sneak attack, many of the enemy would vahe been destroyed, a win - win for the conspiracy. Your version only really worrks if part of the conspiracy was to lose the war.

The conspiracy would make more sense if we provoked the Japs to attack, (something we apparently didn't do) and then ambushed them to insure we would win.

Originally posted by ChaoticThoughts

Part fear, but also because of his word. Like you said, its not something done lightly. How do you feel about those who let out government secrets, or let out ideas of conspiracies, that make us look bad? They are called traitors, or commies, and sometimes crackpots. It was either let out the truth to a public that wouldnt accept it, or live a normal life.

You leave out two other possibilities, one of which is giving the warning anyway, which makes sense to me, even if it meant a courts martial. But not likely. think about it, a warning is passed, he and his CO look like heroes, he then can't be punished for disobeying an order, too many questions would be asked, its a win win.

The other possibility is it never happened.

O-well, thats all history now.
Theres plenty of BS going on now that people should focus on. And maybe stopp it while it still can be.